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Abstract: Safety critical systems developed as part of a product line must still comply with safety 
standards. Standards use the concept of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) to drive the assignment of system 
safety requirements to components of a system under design. However, for a Software Product Line 
(SPL), the safety requirements that need to be allocated to a component may vary in different products. 
Variation in design can indeed change the possible hazards incurred in each product, their causes, and 
can alter the safety requirements placed on individual components in different SPL products. Establishing 
common SILs for components of a large scale SPL by considering all possible usage scenarios, is 
desirable for economies of scale, but it also poses challenges to the safety engineering process. In this 
paper, we propose a method for automatic allocation of SILs to components of a product line. The 
approach is applied to a Hybrid Braking System SPL design. 
Keywords: safety-critical product lines; safety requirements; SILs; requirements allocation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The term Software Product Line (SPL) refers to a software 
development approach that enables software reuse by 
allowing the creation of software applications through the 
composition of common and variable features that address 
the requirements of a particular domain (Clements and 
Northrop, 2001). Features represent desired functionality 
from the user point of view (Lee et al. 2002).  Product line 
design maximizes software reuse across products but must 
still yield safe individual products and this poses research 
challenges.  
Safety assessment processes in many industries are moving 
towards addressing safety from the early stages. Safety 
requirements for a system are captured early and are 
progressively allocated to subsystems and components of the 
architecture. The process must guarantee that, at the end, if 
the component requirements are met, the system 
requirements are also met. This type of allocation of 
requirements is seen as important because it provides a way 
in which safety is controlled throughout the process and is 
not left to emerge (or not) at the end. The question of whether 
or not we can transfer this type of top-down thinking to safety 
in SPL design is addressed in this paper. 
Safety standards use the concept of Safety Integrity Levels 
(SILs) to assign safety requirements with different 
stringencies to components of a system. They take the form 
of Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) in the ISO 
26262 (ISO, 2011) standard for passenger cars, and 
Development Assurance Levels (DALs) in aerospace safety 
standards (EUROCAE, 2010). SILs are assigned early in the 
system design process at system level, just after the system 
hazards have been identified. These hazards are given higher 
or lower SILs depending on how high a risk they pose. As the 
system architecture is being refined, SILs assigned to system-
level hazards are iteratively allocated to subsystems and 
components. ASIL Decomposition is a process that allows 
for a safety-critical architecture to meet a particular target 
ASIL assigned to a hazard without all components that 
contribute to the hazard having to meet that target. For 
example, if a hazard can be caused only when two 
independent components fail together, these components can 
share the responsibility of meeting the ASIL allocated to that 
hazard, rather than each one having to meet the original ASIL 
in full.  
ISO 26262 defines an integer algebra for ASIL 
decomposition which is loosely derived from rules about 
combining probabilities. Each ASIL is equivalent to an 
integer value: QM (Quality Management)=0, A=1, B=2, C= 
3, and D=4. The ASIL algebra defines that if n components 
must fail simultaneously to cause a given hazard, the total 
ASIL assigned to these n components must add up to the 
ASIL of the hazard they originate. So, two redundant 
components assuring a function of ASIL D might 
individually only be required to meet ASIL B because 
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the component requirements are met, the system 
re ire e ts are also et. This type of allocation of 
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system design process at system level, just after the system 
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contribute to the hazard having to meet that target. For 
example, if a hazard can be caused only whe  two 
independent c mponents fail together, these components can 
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hazard, rather than each one having to meet the original ASIL 
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decomposition which is loosely derived from rules about 
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together they produce the total required ASIL value (2 + 2 = 
4). Higher ASILs mean higher costs, because meeting more 
stringent safety requirements typically requires additional 
safety measures, more effort, and components of higher-
quality. Therefore, the ASILs assigned to a component 
significantly affect its development and production costs. 
ASIL decomposition allows designers to efficiently allocate 
requirements so that they can meet the safety requirements 
without being unnecessarily stringent or expensive.  
Recent Model-Based Safety Assessment (MSBA) techniques 
provide frameworks for SILs allocation, by automatically 
identifying combinations of component failures that lead to 
system hazards, and therefore locating opportunities for SIL 
decomposition. HiP-HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard 
Origin & Propagation Studies) (Papadopoulos et al. 2011) is 
an advanced MBSA technique that provides such an 
approach for the process defined in the ISO 26262 standard. 
HiP-HOPS implements a combination of model-based, 
automated Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Tabu Search 
(Azevedo et al. 2013) meta-heuristic optimization algorithm 
that facilitates optimal ASIL allocation and has shown to 
scale up to complex systems.  
Although application of the MBSA process to SPL design 
would be beneficial, this is not straightforward. As safety is 
context-dependent, hazards, their causes, and the 
requirements allocated to SPL components may change 
according to the selection of SPL variants in a particular 
product (Habli, 2009; Habli et al. 2007). Such variation may 
change the safety requirements (i.e., the SILs) placed on 
components in different products of the SPL. Thereby, 
establishing safety requirements for SPL components 
requires finding the SILs allocated to those components in 
different products. If a component is allocated different SILs 
in different products then the highest requirement must be 
met for the component to be safely used across these SPL 
products. This type of allocation would allow developers to 
meet their responsibilities in order to assure the safety of the 
SPL architecture, and to comply with safety standards, 
without incurring the unnecessary high costs of complete 
reanalysis and reallocation of safety requirements as 
traditionally demanded for each product. However, the 
establishment of product line component ASILs in a large 
scale SPL, like a family of automotive powertrain controllers 
with potentially hundreds of members, can be challenging.  
Safety standards do not show how this can be done on a large 
scale, e.g. via automation, and no framework has yet been 
developed to support the automatic allocation of SILs in the 
context of SPLs. Indeed, although emerging SIL allocation 
tools and techniques (Azevedo et al. 2014; Parker et al. 2013; 
Papadopoulos et al. 2010; Mader et al. 2012; Bieber et al. 
2011; Zhang et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2009; Sallak et al. 2008; 
Dhouibi et al. 2014) provide the capability of automatic 
allocation to single SPL products, they do not address 
product lines.  
The novelty of this paper is a concept for allocation of SILs 
to components in product line design, and a method and tool 
to provide the automated support to apply that concept. The 
tool extends upon HiP-HOPS (Azevedo et al. 2014) and is 
applied to the automotive domain. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides an overview of HiP-HOPS and its 
Tabu Search ASIL allocation approach. Section 3 describes 
the method and tool to automatically allocate SILs to SPL 
components from the analysis of multi-product SILs 
allocations. Section 4 presents the case study and evaluation, 
and section 5 shows related work. Finally, section 6 presents 
the conclusion and future research. 
2. HiP-HOPS AND TABU SEARCH 
HiP-HOPS (Papadopoulos et al. 2011) is a method and tool 
for Model-based Safety Analysis, in which system models 
showing components and material energy, and data 
transactions among them are augmented with local failure 
logic. These models are then analysed generating fault trees 
and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs). The HiP-
HOPS tool receives the system description as input in an 
XML schema, but the various implementations of the tool, 
e.g. its connection to MATLAB/Simulink, also provide a 
failure editor that can be used together with graphical 
interfaces to augment the model with safety information. 
Using this editor it is possible to specify hazards related to 
system malfunctions, and the failure logic of components 
described mainly as sets of output deviations and how they 
are caused by logical combinations of internal component 
failures and deviations of the component inputs. Once the 
system models have been annotated with hazards and local 
failure logic, HiP-HOPS synthesizes fault trees for each 
hazard, and then combines them to create an FMEA for the 
system. 
HiP-HOPS rationalizes the allocation and decomposition of 
ASILs to system components, by showing how combinations 
of component failures lead to system hazards. For allocation 
to happen, the potential fault propagation of the system must 
be defined, to determine which component(s) potentially 
contribute to each function failure. The rationale is that a 
component that contributes to a system failure only in 
conjunction with other components may receive a lower SIL 
than a component which directly causes the system failure. 
Thus, the design intention of components, and specifically 
their ability to detect, mask or propagate failures, influences 
SIL allocation across the architecture. For example, some 
components may have been designed to fail silent in response 
to failure, possibly transforming a severe failure mode into a 
less severe failure mode. The contribution of components to 
hazards can be established using the analysis capabilities of 
HiP-HOPS and the synthesized fault trees produced by the 
tool. A fault tree, for instance provides the minimal cut sets 
(i.e. combinations of basic events) that result in system-level 
hazards, and therefore can be used to identify ASIL 
Decomposition opportunities. 
It is often the case that the failure of the same component is 
present in multiple cut sets and all of them must be taken into 
account when finding the most advantageous allocation 
solutions. Furthermore, with the increase in the number of 
components within a system, the number of ASIL allocation 
possibilities increases exponentially. Early implementations 
of exhaustive algorithms (Papadopoulos et al. 2010) for 
allocation in HiP-HOPS were found inadequate in coping 
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context-dependent, hazards, their causes, and the 
requirements allocated to SPL components may change 
according to the selection of SPL variants in a particular 
product (Habli, 2009; Habli et al. 2007). Such variation may 
change the safety requirements (i.e., the SILs) placed on 
components in different products of the SPL. Thereby, 
establishing safety requirements for SPL components 
requires finding the SILs allocated to those components in 
different products. If a component is allocated different SILs 
in different products then the highest requirement must be 
met for the component to be safely used across these SPL 
products. This type of allocation would allow developers to 
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with potentially hundreds of members, can be challenging.  
Safety standards do not show how this can be done on a large 
scale, e.g. via automation, and no framework has yet been 
developed to support the automatic allocation of SILs in the 
context of SPLs. Indeed, although emerging SIL allocation 
tools and techniques (Azevedo et al. 2014; Parker et al. 2013; 
Papadopoulos et al. 2010; Mader et al. 2012; Bieber et al. 
2011; Zhang et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2009; Sallak et al. 2008; 
Dhouibi et al. 2014) provide the capability of automatic 
allocation to single SPL products, they do not address 
product lines.  
The novelty of this paper is a concept for allocation of SILs 
to components in product line design, and a method and tool 
to provide the automated support to apply that concept. The 
tool extends upon HiP-HOPS (Azevedo et al. 2014) and is 
applied to the automotive domain. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides an overview of HiP-HOPS and its 
Tabu Search ASIL allocation approach. Section 3 describes 
the method and tool to automatically allocate SILs to SPL 
components from the analysis of multi-product SILs 
allocations. Section 4 presents the case study and evaluation, 
and section 5 shows related work. Finally, section 6 presents 
the conclusion and future research. 
2. HiP-HOPS AND TABU SEARCH 
HiP-HOPS (Papadopoulos et al. 2011) is a method and tool 
for Model-based Safety Analysis, in which system models 
showing components and material energy, and data 
transactions among them are augmented with local failure 
logic. These models are then analysed generating fault trees 
and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs). The HiP-
HOPS tool receives the system description as input in an 
XML schema, but the various implementations of the tool, 
e.g. its connection to MATLAB/Simulink, also provide a 
failure editor that can be used together with graphical 
interfaces to augment the model with safety information. 
Using this editor it is possible to specify hazards related to 
system malfunctions, and the failure logic of components 
described mainly as sets of output deviations and how they 
are caused by logical combinations of internal component 
failures and deviations of the component inputs. Once the 
system models have been annotated with hazards and local 
failure logic, HiP-HOPS synthesizes fault trees for each 
hazard, and then combines them to create an FMEA for the 
system. 
HiP-HOPS rationalizes the allocation and decomposition of 
ASILs to system components, by showing how combinations 
of component failures lead to system hazards. For allocation 
to happen, the potential fault propagation of the system must 
be defined, to determine which component(s) potentially 
contribute to each function failure. The rationale is that a 
component that contributes to a system failure only in 
conjunction with other components may receive a lower SIL 
than a component which directly causes the system failure. 
Thus, the design intention of components, and specifically 
their ability to detect, mask or propagate failures, influences 
SIL allocation across the architecture. For example, some 
components may have been designed to fail silent in response 
to failure, possibly transforming a severe failure mode into a 
less severe failure mode. The contribution of components to 
hazards can be established using the analysis capabilities of 
HiP-HOPS and the synthesized fault trees produced by the 
tool. A fault tree, for instance provides the minimal cut sets 
(i.e. combinations of basic events) that result in system-level 
hazards, and therefore can be used to identify ASIL 
Decomposition opportunities. 
It is often the case that the failure of the same component is 
present in multiple cut sets and all of them must be taken into 
account when finding the most advantageous allocation 
solutions. Furthermore, with the increase in the number of 
components within a system, the number of ASIL allocation 
possibilities increases exponentially. Early implementations 
of exhaustive algorithms (Papadopoulos et al. 2010) for 
allocation in HiP-HOPS were found inadequate in coping 
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with the complexity of realistic models. Investigations were, 
therefore, directed towards meta-heuristics such as genetic 
algorithms. These optimization algorithms are known to find 
good solutions, through guided search of the design space. In 
addition, they are known to be robust in dealing with a 
variety of problems.  
Meta-heuristics do not guarantee finding optimal solutions; 
however, they are capable of providing near optimal 
allocations within acceptable time spans. Many meta-
heuristics exist, and recent research has applied some of the 
most popular ones to the ASIL Allocation optimization 
problem. Tabu Search (TS) (Azevedo et al. 2014) has shown 
promising results in both the quality of the solutions found as 
well as processing times. The TS extension of HiP-HOPS 
draws from the work of Hansen and Lih (1996) for reliability 
optimization and it goes by the name of Steepest Descent 
Mildest Ascent (SDMA). The method consists of iteratively 
finding the ASIL that by being decremented reduces the cost 
of a solution (the steepest descent direction). 
3. AUTOMATIC ALLOCATION OF SAFETY 
INTEGRITY LEVELS TO PRODUCT LINE 
COMPONENTS 
In this work we extended the above capabilities to enable 
allocation of safety requirements to components of a product 
line. The concept extends the capabilities of the HiP-HOPS 
method and tool for application in SPL design. The key idea 
concerns the ability to automatically instantiate a large set of 
products from an SPL in a variable SPL model augmented 
with possible hazards and the local failure logic of 
components. Products are then sent in turn to HiP-HOPS, 
which performs ASIL allocation for each product. 
Components may receive different allocations in different 
products, so the ability to use safely a component across a 
range of products means selecting the highest allocation 
given by this analysis. This is the basis of the proposed 
method for automatic allocation of safety requirements to 
SPL components from the analysis of requirements allocation 
results performed in multiple SPL products. 
The method was implemented in a prototype tool developed 
using Java as a compliment to HiP-HOPS. The method 
requires a pre-processing step to support the augmentation of 
SPL architecture models with hazards and failure logic 
information, and the enumeration of all products of an SPL 
via resolution of variability (i.e. product derivation). The 
latter can be a selective manual process or an automated 
process. The automated implementation of this feature has 
been done in MATLAB/Simulink using a set of mechanisms 
to specify variability and with the support of the 
Hephaestus/Simulink (Steiner et al. 2013) SPL variability 
management tool. Alternative SPL tools such as Common 
Variability Language (CVL) implemented in Eclipse 
(Haugen et al. 2008) can also be used. 
Simulink variability patterns (Steiner et al. 2013; Botterweck 
et al. 2010) representing optional (Enabler subsystems), 
alternative (Switch blocks), and inclusive-or (Integration 
blocks) features have been used for modelling variation in the 
SPL architecture. The Hephaestus/Simulink tool was used in 
this approach to support the variability management in 
Simulink models described using these patterns. The 
automated derivation of the enumerated SPL product models 
augmented with hazards and failure logic requires the 
specification of the configuration knowledge. This provides a 
set of rules showing how SPL design assets, hazards, and 
failure logic can be composed in a product. Rules are 
specified according to feature model constraints. The feature 
model captures structural or conceptual relationships between 
common and variable functions of products of a domain (Lee 
et al. 2002). 
SPL configuration knowledge is specified by means of 
Hephaestus/Simulink by applying the following steps: 1) 
specify the feature expressions in the scope of the usage 
scenarios described in the feature model. A feature 
expression may include a single feature or a combination of 
two or more features; 2) for each feature expression, 
determine the SPL design elements to be included and 
excluded; and 3) specify the hazards, the allocated safety 
requirements, and the failure logic to be included/excluded in 
each feature expression.  
After performing these steps, the mapping between product 
line features, design elements, hazards, the allocated safety 
requirements, and component failure logic is obtained. 
Additional details on how to use SPL variability management 
tools to specify the configuration knowledge can be found in 
(Steiner et al. 2013). Finally, the variability management tool 
was adapted by implementing an instantiation script with the 
support of a feature model solver, in this case the T-wise 
covering arrays algorithm (Johansen et al. 2012), to 
automatically derive a set of SPL products according to the 
constraints specified in the feature model. 
Once a range of SPL products have been enumerated from a 
variable SPL architecture model, the products (i.e., system 
models annotated with failure information) are then provided 
to HiP-HOPS for analysis. The ASIL allocations generated 
by applying HiP-HOPS to the enumeration of the SPL 
products are the inputs to the method and tool developed in 
this paper. HiP-HOPS exports the ASIL allocation of each 
individual product in an XML file. In the proposed method, 
these files are parsed and the analysis is performed. Firstly, 
the XML files are analysed one by one to obtain the ASILs 
allocated to SPL components in each product. This is done by 
analysing the ASILs allocated to the failure modes associated 
to each SPL component in each individual product. The most 
stringent ASIL allocated to a failure mode associated with 
particular component is the component ASIL for that product. 
For each product, this is repeated for all components 
belonging to the product. After obtaining the ASILs allocated 
to product line components in each individual product, for 
each SPL component, the analysis is performed as follows: 
the ASILs allocated to a particular SPL component in 
different products are analysed in order to verify the most 
stringent ASIL allocated to that component across the SPL. 
Thus, the ASIL that each SPL component should meet is 
obtained, and the results, i.e. the ASILs allocated to all SPL 
components are exported in XML file format.  
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4. EVALUATION 
The method and tool were applied to a Hybrid Braking 
System (De Castro et al. 2011) automotive product line 
(HBS-SPL). Hazard analysis and the definition of local 
failure logic were performed based on the failure logic 
analysis technique supported by HiP-HOPS, and taking into 
account the interactions between HBS-SPL components 
expressed in the feature model. Three HBS-SPL products 
(i.e., usage scenarios) were considered in the evaluation of 
the proposed method: HBS four wheels braking (HBS-4WB), 
front wheels braking (HBS-FWB), and rear wheels braking 
(HBS-RWB). 
The HBS-SPL is a prototype automotive braking system SPL 
designed in MATLAB/Simulink. HBS-SPL is meant for 
electrical vehicles integration, in particular for propulsion 
architectures that integrate one electrical motor per wheel. 
The term hybrid comes from the fact that braking is achieved 
through the combined action of the electrical In-Wheel 
Motors (IWMs) and frictional Electromechanical Brakes 
(EMBs). One of the most important features of this system is 
that the integration of IWM in the braking process allows an 
increase in the vehicle’s range: while braking, IWMs work as 
generators and transform the vehicles kinetic energy into 
electrical energy that is fed into the powertrain battery. IWMs 
have, however, braking torque availability limitations at high 
wheel speeds or when the powertrain battery is close to full 
state of charge. EMBs are introduced to provide the torque 
needed to match the total braking demand. HBS-SPL 
components can be combined in different ways according to 
the constraints specified in the HBS-SPL feature model 
presented in Fig. 1. The feature model was designed using a 
cardinality-based notation (Czarnecki et al. 2004).  
 
Fig. 1. HBS-SPL feature model. 
The HBS-SPL feature model includes wheel braking 
alternative features: Brake_Unit1, Brake_Unit2, 
Brake_Unit3, and Brake_Unit4 aimed to provide the braking 
for each wheel. The three HBS products earlier described 
have a common principle: a Mechanical Pedal is responsible 
for capturing the driver’s braking demands; an Electronic 
Pedal senses these actions and transforms them into braking 
requests for each wheel that is equipped with braking 
features; subsequently, it sends these requests via a duplex 
bus communication system to the Brake Units. Each Brake 
Unit integrates a Wheel Node Controller that calculates the 
amount of braking torque to be produced by each actuator. 
Commands are generated accordingly and sent to the power 
converters to control the two braking devices. While braking, 
power flows from the IWMs to the Powertrain Battery and 
from the vehicle’s low voltage Auxiliary Battery to the 
EMBs. The elements of the vehicle’s power architecture 
should be regarded as subsystems that include multiple 
components – the Powertrain Battery, for example, integrates 
a Battery Management System (BMS) which is composed by 
complex hardware and software elements. 
Hazards can arise in this system from the interaction between 
design elements in a range of usage scenarios. Safety 
requirements placed to a particular HBS-SPL hazard may 
also change according to contextual elements such as 
operational environment, safety standards, and regulations. 
These elements can be represented in an SPL context model 
(Lee et al. 2002). In this paper we have limited ourselves to 
performing the HBS-SPL hazard analysis based only on the 
SPL feature model. Product line features stand for system 
functions implemented by design elements (e.g. system, 
subsystems, components). 
Performing a hazard analysis covering all possible scenarios 
for HBS-SPL would yield voluminous results. Nevertheless, 
scoping the hazard analysis to a set of products has shown 
some degree of reuse for safety analysis assets (e.g. fault 
trees, FMEA, ASIL allocation). The Wheel Braking variation 
point specified in the HBS-SPL feature model was 
considered in performing the hazard analysis. From the 
analysis of the Wheel Braking variation point and mandatory 
elements from HBS-SPL, as mentioned earlier, the following 
usage scenarios were established: HBS-4WB; HBS-FWB; 
and HBS-RWB. These scenarios were analysed from the 
safety perspective. Table 1 presents the identified hazards, 
their causes, and the allocated ASILs (Automotive Safety 
Integrity Levels). Table 1 also presents the association 
between the hazards and the usage scenarios by means of the 
column “Scenario”. 
Table 1. HBS-SPL hazards and ASIL allocation. 
Scenario Hazard Causes ASIL 
 
 
HBS-
4WB 
No braking 
four wheels 
Omission of all brake unit actuators 
outputs. 
D 
No braking 
three wheels 
Omission of brake unit1, and brake 
unit2, and brake unit3 actuators 
outputs. 
D 
No braking 
front 
Omission of brake unit1 and brake 
unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
No braking 
rear 
Omission of brake unit3 and 
brake_unit4 actuators outputs. 
C 
No braking 
diagonal 
Omission of brake unit1 and brake 
unit4 actuators outputs or Omission 
of brake unit2 and brake unit4 
actuators outputs. 
C 
Value braking Incorrect Value of all brake unit 
actuators outputs 
D 
HBS-
FWB  
No braking 
front 
Omission of brake unit1 and brake 
unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
Value braking Incorrect Value of brake unit1 and 
brake unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
HBS-
RWB  
No braking 
rear 
Omission of brake unit3 and brake 
unit4 actuators outputs. 
D 
Value braking Incorrect Value of brake unit3 and 
brake unit4 actuators outputs. 
D 
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4. EVALUATION 
The method and tool were applied to a Hybrid Braking 
System (De Castro et al. 2011) automotive product line 
(HBS-SPL). Hazard analysis and the definition of local 
failure logic were performed based on the failure logic 
analysis technique supported by HiP-HOPS, and taking into 
account the interactions between HBS-SPL components 
expressed in the feature model. Three HBS-SPL products 
(i.e., usage scenarios) were considered in the evaluation of 
the proposed method: HBS four wheels braking (HBS-4WB), 
front wheels braking (HBS-FWB), and rear wheels braking 
(HBS-RWB). 
The HBS-SPL is a prototype automotive braking system SPL 
designed in MATLAB/Simulink. HBS-SPL is meant for 
electrical vehicles integration, in particular for propulsion 
architectures that integrate one electrical motor per wheel. 
The term hybrid comes from the fact that braking is achieved 
through the combined action of the electrical In-Wheel 
Motors (IWMs) and frictional Electromechanical Brakes 
(EMBs). One of the most important features of this system is 
that the integration of IWM in the braking process allows an 
increase in the vehicle’s range: while braking, IWMs work as 
generators and transform the vehicles kinetic energy into 
electrical energy that is fed into the powertrain battery. IWMs 
have, however, braking torque availability limitations at high 
wheel speeds or when the powertrain battery is close to full 
state of charge. EMBs are introduced to provide the torque 
needed to match the total braking demand. HBS-SPL 
components can be combined in different ways according to 
the constraints specified in the HBS-SPL feature model 
presented in Fig. 1. The feature model was designed using a 
cardinality-based notation (Czarnecki et al. 2004).  
 
Fig. 1. HBS-SPL feature model. 
The HBS-SPL feature model includes wheel braking 
alternative features: Brake_Unit1, Brake_Unit2, 
Brake_Unit3, and Brake_Unit4 aimed to provide the braking 
for each wheel. The three HBS products earlier described 
have a common principle: a Mechanical Pedal is responsible 
for capturing the driver’s braking demands; an Electronic 
Pedal senses these actions and transforms them into braking 
requests for each wheel that is equipped with braking 
features; subsequently, it sends these requests via a duplex 
bus communication system to the Brake Units. Each Brake 
Unit integrates a Wheel Node Controller that calculates the 
amount of braking torque to be produced by each actuator. 
Commands are generated accordingly and sent to the power 
converters to control the two braking devices. While braking, 
power flows from the IWMs to the Powertrain Battery and 
from the vehicle’s low voltage Auxiliary Battery to the 
EMBs. The elements of the vehicle’s power architecture 
should be regarded as subsystems that include multiple 
components – the Powertrain Battery, for example, integrates 
a Battery Management System (BMS) which is composed by 
complex hardware and software elements. 
Hazards can arise in this system from the interaction between 
design elements in a range of usage scenarios. Safety 
requirements placed to a particular HBS-SPL hazard may 
also change according to contextual elements such as 
operational environment, safety standards, and regulations. 
These elements can be represented in an SPL context model 
(Lee et al. 2002). In this paper we have limited ourselves to 
performing the HBS-SPL hazard analysis based only on the 
SPL feature model. Product line features stand for system 
functions implemented by design elements (e.g. system, 
subsystems, components). 
Performing a hazard analysis covering all possible scenarios 
for HBS-SPL would yield voluminous results. Nevertheless, 
scoping the hazard analysis to a set of products has shown 
some degree of reuse for safety analysis assets (e.g. fault 
trees, FMEA, ASIL allocation). The Wheel Braking variation 
point specified in the HBS-SPL feature model was 
considered in performing the hazard analysis. From the 
analysis of the Wheel Braking variation point and mandatory 
elements from HBS-SPL, as mentioned earlier, the following 
usage scenarios were established: HBS-4WB; HBS-FWB; 
and HBS-RWB. These scenarios were analysed from the 
safety perspective. Table 1 presents the identified hazards, 
their causes, and the allocated ASILs (Automotive Safety 
Integrity Levels). Table 1 also presents the association 
between the hazards and the usage scenarios by means of the 
column “Scenario”. 
Table 1. HBS-SPL hazards and ASIL allocation. 
Scenario Hazard Causes ASIL 
 
 
HBS-
4WB 
No braking 
four wheels 
Omission of all brake unit actuators 
outputs. 
D 
No braking 
three wheels 
Omission of brake unit1, and brake 
unit2, and brake unit3 actuators 
outputs. 
D 
No braking 
front 
Omission of brake unit1 and brake 
unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
No braking 
rear 
Omission of brake unit3 and 
brake_unit4 actuators outputs. 
C 
No braking 
diagonal 
Omission of brake unit1 and brake 
unit4 actuators outputs or Omission 
of brake unit2 and brake unit4 
actuators outputs. 
C 
Value braking Incorrect Value of all brake unit 
actuators outputs 
D 
HBS-
FWB  
No braking 
front 
Omission of brake unit1 and brake 
unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
Value braking Incorrect Value of brake unit1 and 
brake unit2 actuators outputs. 
D 
HBS-
RWB  
No braking 
rear 
Omission of brake unit3 and brake 
unit4 actuators outputs. 
D 
Value braking Incorrect Value of brake unit3 and 
brake unit4 actuators outputs. 
D 
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It is considered that no braking is being produced in a wheel 
whenever both braking devices of that wheel (an IWM and an 
EMB) are omitting their outputs. Braking with an incorrect 
value happens when at least one of the braking actuators is 
providing braking torque that is higher or lower than the 
values demanded. In order to simplify the case study, we 
have only discussed the allocation of ASILs to product line 
hazards on the basis of the severity (rather than the full ISO 
26262 risk assessment process). In a product line hazard 
analysis, different ASILs can be assigned to the same hazard 
considering different usage scenarios for SPL components. 
For example, the ASIL allocated to the “No braking rear” 
hazard is more stringent in HBS-RWB scenario and less 
stringent in HBS-4WB. Causes for a particular hazard may 
also change according to how product line components can 
be composed in a product. 
The causes for the “Value braking” hazard in HBS-FWB are 
different from the causes for that hazard in HBS-RWB. HBS-
SPL hazards and ASIL allocation information are stored by 
HiP-HOPS in the failure model. From the analysis of HBS-
SPL hazards (Table 1), 77 failure logic expressions were 
added to 30 HBS-SPL components; through different fault 
propagations, the causes described in these expressions 
combine and give rise to hazards in different product 
configurations. This process was automated as product 
models augmented with hazards and local failure logic were 
sent to HiP-HOPS which created fault trees, failure cut sets, 
and FMEA results for each HBS-SPL product.   
The cut sets generated for the HBS-SPL products are the 
inputs for the HiP-HOPS allocation algorithm. The allocation 
was performed for each HBS-SPL product based on the 
following example cost heuristic that expresses the relative 
cost jumps of developing a component according to the 
different ASILs: 0 (ASIL QM), 10 (ASIL A), 20 (ASIL B), 
40 (ASIL C), and 50 (ASIL D). This expression was used for 
illustrative purposes, but any other that the system designer 
finds more suitable can be used instead.  
The HBS-4WB, HBS-FWB, and HBS-RWB ASIL 
allocations provided by HiP-HOPS analysis were the inputs 
for the proposed method and tool performing the analysis to 
allocate ASILs to SPL components. The ASILs allocated to 
30 HBS-SPL components in three different products were 
analyzed and the process took 14 seconds to complete. Table 
2 presents the ASILs allocated to HBS-SPL components in 
each product, and the final ASILs allocated to HBS-SPL 
components (column “ASIL”). Due to space limitations, 
Table 2 presents ASILs allocated to 16 HBS-SPL 
components. 
ASILs allocated to a particular HBS-SPL component may 
change according to the product. For example, the ASILs 
allocated to Brake_Unit1, Brake_Unit1.EMB, and 
Brake_Unit1.EMB_Power_Converter components are 
respectively “A”, “A”, and “A” in HBS-4WB, and “QM”, 
“B”, and “B” in HBS-FWB. The ASIL costs related to each 
HBS-SPL product ASIL allocation was also generated by the 
tool along with the ASIL cost for the HBS-SPL (cell “Cost 
for the MAX ASIL” on Table 2). It is higher than the product 
costs as it represents the worst case where any component of 
the SPL is designed to be safely used across all SPL products 
considered by the analysis.  
Table 2. HIP-HOPS Tabu Search ASIL decomposition 
results for HBS-SPL products. 
HBS-SPL Component 
Name 
HBS-
4WB 
ASIL 
HBS-
FWB 
ASIL 
HBS-
RWB 
ASIL 
MAX ASIL 
Auxiliary_Battery D (4) D (4) D (4) D (4) 
Brake_Unit1 A (1) QM (0) - A (1) 
Brake_Unit1.EMB A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
Brake_Unit1.EMB_ 
Power_Converter 
A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
Brake_Unit1.IWM A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
Brake_Unit1.IWM_ 
Power_Converter 
A (1) B (2) - B (2) 
… … … … … 
Brake_Unit4 A (1) - B (2)  B (2)  
Brake_Unit4.EMB A (1) - B (2) B (2) 
Brake_Unit4.EMB_ 
Power_Converter 
D (4) - B (2) D (4) 
Brake_Unit4.IWM QM (0) - B (2) B (2) 
Brake_Unit4.IWM_ 
Power_Converter 
B (2) - B (2) B (2) 
Communication_Bus1 B (2) B (2) B (2) B (2) 
Communication_Bus2 B (2) B (2) B (2) B (2) 
Electronic_Pedal D (4) D (4)  D (4) D (4) 
Mechanical_Pedal D (4) D (4) D (4) D (4) 
Electronic_Pedal D (4) D (4) D (4) D (4) 
Cost 520 460 470 730 
Analysis of the implications on safety requirements of 
possible usage of components provides useful feedback to the 
SPL development process, contributing to meeting safety 
requirements without incurring unnecessary costs.  
The tool developed for this work was tested against 
performance requirements in this case study. The processing 
time to analyze 72 hybrid braking system SPL products was 
reasonable, about 4 minute and 40 seconds, considering that 
the complexity of the analysis has increased substantially as 
the numbers of the products increased. 
5. RELATED WORK 
In earlier work, Papadopoulos et al. (2010) proposed an 
approach to automatically allocate ASILs to subsystems and 
components of a hierarchical system model according to ISO 
26262. The ASIL allocation and decomposition algorithm 
was implemented in HiP-HOPS (Papadopoulos et al. 2011). 
The HiP-HOPS ASIL allocation algorithm was further 
improved with optimization heuristics to reach an optimal 
allocation. A penalty-based genetic algorithm (Parker et al. 
2013) and Tabu Search (Azevedo et al. 2014) algorithms 
were implemented to improve the performance of ASIL 
allocation in large scale systems.  
Mader et al. (2012) proposed an approach for ASIL 
allocation focused on finding optimal allocations; a linear 
programming optimization problem is formulated to discover 
a solution that minimizes the sum of ASILs assigned across 
the system architecture. Zhang et al. (2010) proposed a 
workflow for embedded system development, which includes 
fault trees, FMEA, and ASIL allocation based on a qualitative 
risk graph method. Dhouibi et al. (2014) introduced a method 
for ASIL allocation which is based on interpreting the 
allocation problem as a system of linear equations. Bieber et 
al. (2011) presented a theory to formalize the ARP 4754A 
DAL allocation rules (EUROCAE, 2010) and the 
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DALculator tool to support automatic DAL allocation. Lee et 
al. (2009) presented an approach based on fault trees and 
their top-events (i.e., probabilities for failure on demand) to 
derive SILs for system functions according to IEC 61508. A 
fuzzy probabilistic SILs allocation technique in compliance 
with IEC 61508 was also proposed by Sallak et al. (2008).  
Existing tools and techniques for automatic allocation of SILs 
were not designed to address product lines. These techniques 
can benefit from the concepts proposed in this paper. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We described a method for allocation of SILs to components 
in product line design. A prototype tool was developed which 
performs automatic ASIL allocation for product line 
components taking into account their possible usage across 
the product line. We have discussed, both in theory and 
through an example, how the use of such a method and tool 
can potentially reduce the cost of SPL development by 
allocating less stringent ASILs to SPL components whilst 
meeting safety requirements. Through this technique, it is 
possible to specify safety requirements for components 
anticipating their possible use in a number of products. This 
work addresses an important issue and extends and automates 
principles enshrined in modern safety standards to address 
SPL design.  
Further work needs to be done to elucidate and explain the 
preparation and automatic resolution of variable models 
augmented with failure logic that can be used by this method. 
Additional research is also ongoing to validate this approach 
in different industrial context. 
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